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United States v. Piccinonna'
Underwood v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.2
For over fifty years, various forms of polygraph evidence have not been
admissible into evidence While courts occasionally have flirted with greater
admissibility,4 the general rule today is that expert testimony on polygraph
examinations is not admissible. Even courts which do allow expert polygraph
testimony severely restrict its admissibility. Admissibility often is subject to
the sound discretion of the trial court.5 Despite criticisms that polygraph
testing has been validated scientifically and that other forms of scientific
evidence pose the same problems, courts have been reluctant to sanction the
use of any evidence concerning polygraph testing.6 Two recent federal cases
shed new light on the topic, illustrating slight modifications in the judiciary's
attitude towards the admissibility of this category of evidence.
Recently, the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits, respectively, reviewed the
rules of evidence as applied to polygraph 7 evidence in United States v.
Piccinonna8 and Underwood v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.9 While both
courts held in favor of greater admissibility of polygraph evidence, neither
held that polygraph evidence should be admissible under the same standards
as other scientific evidence. Instead, the courts established intermediate
approaches to the admissibility of polygraph evidence. It is beyond the scope
of this Note to attempt to address the reliability of polygraph evidence.
Instead, this Note considers the different rules for admissibility set forth in
these two cases and presents a critical look at these intermediate standards.
1. 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
2. 888 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1989).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 51-77.
4. Sevilla, Polygraph 1984: Behind the Closed Door of Admissibility, 16 U.
WEST L.A. L. REv. 5, 6 (1984).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
6. See generally Sevilla, supra note 4.
7. The polygraph is often referred to in lay terms as the lie-detector.
8. 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
9. 888 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1989).
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I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Piccinonna and Underwood present interesting contexts in which to
reexamine polygraph admissibility because they illustrate the variety of
situations in which the question may arise. The factual differences in the
cases are striking. One is a criminal case; one is a civil action. In one, the
polygraph test had been administered before trial. In the other, no polygraph
exam was given. While in both suits the polygraph evidence was offered by
the defendant, one case involved the use of the evidence to exculpate the
defendant, and in the other case the defendant offered the evidence to
inculpate the plaintiff as an arsonist. Thus, there is a contrast in the defensive
and offensive uses of polygraph evidence. More striking, however, is the way
in which the courts chose to deal with greater polygraph admissibility.
A. United States v. Piccinonna°
In United States v. Piccinonna, Julio Piccinonna appealed his conviction
on two counts of perjury." Piccinonna claimed that the trial court erred in
not admitting the testimony of a polygraph expert and the results of a
polygraph examination. 2 The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for a
determination of admissibility according to the new rules provided by the
opinion. 3
Piccinonna arose out of an investigation by a grand jury into alleged
antitrust violations in the South Florida garbage industry.14  Piccinonna
worked in the waste disposal business, and received a grant of immunity for
his testimony on the antitrust violations. The grant did not protect him from
a perjury prosecution.' 5 "Piccinonna testified that he had not heard of the
agreement between garbage companies to refrain from soliciting each other's
accounts and to compensate each other for taking accounts," but several
witnesses' testimony implied that Piccinonna was a part of the agreement. 16
This led to Piccinonna's indictment for four counts of perjury. 7
10. 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
11. Id. at 1530. A grand jury convicted Piccinonna for violating Title IV of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982). Piccinonna, 885
F.2d at 1530.
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Before trial, the government refused to stipulate about the admissibility
of a polygraph expert's testimony or the results of a polygraph test.1
8
Nevertheless, Piccinonna took a polygraph test from a licensed examiner and
claimed that the examiner's report proved that Piccinonna did not lie before
the grand jury. 9 On Piccinonna's motion, the district court held a hearing
on the admissibility of the polygraph evidence.20 The court held that the per
se exclusionary rule on polygraph evidence required exclusion of the
evidence.21 The court, however, allowed Piccinonna, after his conviction, to
perfect the record for appeal by including the polygraph examination report
in the event that the Eleventh Circuit wished to reevaluate its rule regarding
polygraphic evidence.m
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit created the following standards for
polygraph evidence admissibility: -subject to Federal Rules of Evidence
40123 and 40324 and the rules covering expert testimony 2-
(1) where the parties stipulate in advance as to the circumstances and
scope of admissibility of polygraph evidence, then the judge shall admit
such evidence;
(2) even without stipulation, polygraph evidence may be used to
impeach or corroborate a witness where
(a) a party gives notice that it intends to use polygraph
evidence,
18. Id. As will be discussed later, stipulation by the parties before a polygraph
examination is administered as to its admissibility is one of the few widely recognized




22. Id. at 1530-31. The record on appeal included the report of the polygraph
examination and the transcript of an evidentiary hearing in another case. Id. at 1531.
23. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 401.
24. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 403.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 702-705.
1991]
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(b) the opposing party has an opportunity to administer its
own polygraph examination, and
(c) the requirements for admissibility under the Federal
Rules of Evidence are met for impeachment or corroboration
testimony, then the judge shall admit such evidence at his or her
discretion.26
B. Underwood v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.27
In April of 1986, Rudolph W. Underwood purchased a homeowner's
insurance policy with the defendant, Colonial Penn Insurance Company.2
Colonial later cancelled the policy.29 While Underwood received notice of
the cancellation on June 2, 1986, the effective date of cancellation was June
23, 1986.30 Underwood also had a renter's insurance policy with American
General Insurance Company covering the same house.31
On May 13, 1986, Underwood reported to American General and to the
police that electronic equipment had been stolen from his home.32 A deputy
sheriff went to Underwood's home on June 12, 1986, to investigate the
report.3 3 Later that day, Underwood's home was completely destroyed by
fire.34 Colonial refused to pay Underwood's claim for the fire loss, and
Underwood sued.35
Underwood testified that he told the deputy sheriff that "he would
cooperate in the theft investigation."3 6 On cross-examination, the defense
sought to introduce evidence that Underwood was uncooperative 37 and that
he refused to take a polygraph examination.38 Underwood moved for a
26. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
27. 888 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1989).
28. Id. at 589.
29. Id.
30. Id. On June 8,1986, Underwood responded by taking out an insurance policy
with Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company. Prudential paid
Underwood's claim for the loss of his home on June 12, 1986. Prudential intervened
in the original suit and appealed to maintain its ability to intervene if Underwood was
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mistrial. 39 The motion was denied, and the court admitted the evidence
concerning Underwood's refusal to submit to a polygraph examination.4"
The trial court stated four reasons for admitting the evidence of Underwood's
refusal to take a polygraph examination. First, the evidence was admissible
"under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake."41 Second, the
evidence could be used to impeach Underwood.42 Third, defense counsel
"inadvertently injected" Underwood's refusal to submit to an exam.43 Fourth,
the trial court found "the probative value outweighed any prejudicial
effect. 44
The jury returned a verdict for Colonial, and the court denied
Underwood's motion for a new trial.45 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held:
(1) the evidence was admissible "under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to
show motive, plan, scheme, [or] design[;]" 46 and (2) the evidence was
admissible to impeach Underwood's credibility because of (a) Federal Rule of
Evidence 613; (b) Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2); or (c) to impeach
"Underwood's credibility by contradiction." 47 In addition, the court found
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 satisfied; the probative value of the refusal to
take the polygraph exam outweighed any unfair prejudice.48 The court
specifically limited its holding to the facts presented. 49 Because the evidence
of Underwood's refusal to take a polygraph exam was "admissible to show
motive and to impeach", the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Underwood's motions, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 0
39. Id. The court had instructed defense counsel "not to mention Underwood's
refusal to take the polygraph test until the court had an opportunity to research
Arkansas law on the admission of polygraphs." Id.
40. Id. at 589-90.





46. Id. The court specifically stated that the evidence was "not offered as
substantive evidence." Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Frye v. United States 51 was the first reported case on the question of
admissibility of polygraph evidence.52 The Frye court, while acknowledging
the need for expert testimony to aid the jury in understanding matters beyond
"common experience or common knowledge,"53 distinguished between
"experimental and demonstrable stages" of scientific endeavors.54 To admit
expert scientific testimony, the court held that the testimony must be based
upon scientific principles which "have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. '55 The court held that the systolic blood
pressure test involved in Frye did not meet this requirement.56
Frye was the basis for excluding polygraph evidence for fifty years.57
Increasingly, courts have criticized application of the Frye standard for the
exclusion of polygraph evidence.58 "[T]he courts excluding polygraph results
almost invariably rely on three grounds for ruling polygraph evidence
inadmissible: unreliability, lack of sufficient examiner or technique standards,
and undue impact on the jury. 5 9 Scholars have widely debated the continu-
ing validity of these criticisms.6° Reliability and validity go to the very heart
of the polygraph debate; these issues question the assumptions on which
polygraph is based and its accuracy.61 The lack of examiner and technique
standards "is premised on the objection that the integrity of a polygraph
51. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
52. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894, 896 (1962). Frye involved "a
systolic blood pressure test, the precursor of the polygraph." Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at
1531.
53. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
54. Id.
55. Id. The burden of proof as to the general acceptance of the principle or
technique in the scientific community is on the proponent of the evidence. Piccinonna,
885 F.2d at 1531 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (3d ed. 1984)).
56. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
57. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1531 n.4; Sevilla, supra note 4, at 7.
58. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1532; MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 628.
59. Sevilla, supra note 4, at 16. See also Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1532.
60. The scope of this Note is much too limited to deal with the various
contentions raised. For the discussion in the Piccinonna case, see Piccinonna, 885
F.2d at 1532-33, 1537-41. See generally Sevilla, supra note 4, at 16-25.
61. See, e.g., Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1538-41. For a brief treatment of how the
polygraph works, see Note, Banning the Truth-Finder in Employment: The Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 54 Mo. L. REv. 155, 156-62 (1989). For a
synopsis of the attacks on reliability and validity, see Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1537-41
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also MCCORMICK, supra
note 55, at 626-27.
(Vol. 56
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examination depends almost entirely on [the] experience and competence of
the examiner."'62 The objection to polygraph evidence as having too great an
influence upon the jury is based on a fear that the jury will attach too great
an importance to the "scientific" finding of the polygraph examiner.
6 3
"When polygraph evidence is offered in evidence at trial, it is likely to be
shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of
Delphi."' Consistent with the differing opinions of the commentators, the
courts have developed varying standards of admissibility.
There are now three general approaches to the admissibility of polygraph
evidence.65 The "traditional approach" excludes all polygraph evidence
whether offered as substantive evidence, for impeachment, or for corrobora-
tion.66 According to the Piccinonna court, the Fourth, Fifth, and District of
Columbia Circuits follow this approach.67
A second approach admits polygraph evidence in the judge's discretion
where the parties have stipulated to admissibility before the exam is
administered.( The Eighth Circuit generally follows this approach. 69 The
Eighth Circuit, however, seems willing to permit polygraph evidence in other
situations as well.70
62. Sevilla, supra note 4, at 18. For states with licensing requirements for
polygraph examiners, see Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Licensing
or Otherwise Regulating Operators of Polygraph or Similar Devices, 32 A.L.R. 3d
1324 (1970 & Supp. 1990). See also Sevilla, supra note 4, at 19 nn. 54-55 (objections
and citations concerning polygraph standards) (impact of state licensing statutes).
63. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 630. "[T]he evidence on this issue is at best
inconclusive." Sevilla, supra note 4, at 17 (citing Giannelli, TheAdmissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
1197, 1240 (1980)).
64. Sevilla, supra note 4, at 16-17 (citing United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d
161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975)).
65. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1533; MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 628.
66. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1533; MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 628.
67. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1534. The court notes that these circuits have
occasionally suggested a more liberal approach but have always continued with the per
se exclusion rule. For example, in United States v. Clark, 622 F.2d 917 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981), twelve concurring judges expressed their
willingness to reconsider the per se rule once an appropriate case arises. Piccinonna,
885 F.2d at 1534; see also MCCORMICK, supra Ilote 55, at 628.
68. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1533; MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 628-29.
69. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1534. See Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d 517,
519 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975).
70. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1534. See United States v. Yeo, 739 F.2d 385, 388
(8th Cir. 1984) (government allowed to call polygraph expert where offered to rebut
evidence responsive to defendant's testimony); United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731,
1991]
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The third approach allows admission of polygraph evidence in the
discretion of the court where special circumstances are present, without
requiring stipulation between the parties.71 The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, and the Court of Military Appeals all follow this approach,
although the circumstances required for admission vary. 2 Some of these
circumstances include allowing polygraph evidence to rebut the defendant's
claim that his confession was procured through coercion, to explain why a
police investigation was not conducted more thoroughly after the defendant
had failed a polygraph test, and to show that a polygraph exam was adminis-
tered when that fact is relevant in itself.73
Thus, the courts have fashioned several approaches to polygraph
evidence. These approaches vary from the general rule for expert scientific
evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 702.'4 Some commentators, including
McCormick, have stated that polygraph evidence should be treated the same
as other scientific evidence for purposes of admissibility,75 with Rule 403
providing sufficient safeguards. 76 As stated in McCormick, "[a] great deal
of lay testimony routinely admitted is at least as unreliable and inaccurate, and
other forms of scientific evidence involve risks of instrumental or judgmental
error."77  Despite such criticisms, the courts have retained a cautious
approach to polygraph admissibility based on the three principal concerns of
unreliability, lack of standardization, and undue jury influence.
736 (8th Cir. 1975) (discretionary rather than per se rule applied where parties
stipulated to use of exam results).
71. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1533-34; MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 629.
72. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1535.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
75. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 203. See also Trautman, Logical or Legal
Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 396 (1952).
76. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
77. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 629.
[Vol. 56
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III. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. United States v. Piccinonna
After reviewing traditional objections to the admissibility of polygraph
evidence and the approaches taken by the several circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
specifically rejected the per se exclusion rule78 and developed new standards
for admissibility. The court gave three reasons why it was abandoning the per
se rule.79 First, the court cited the great technological advances in the field
of polygraph. 80 Second, polygraph testing has received "increasingly
widespread acceptance as a useful and reliable scientific tool."81 Third, the
court found no convincing evidence that juries are unduly influenced by
polygraph evidence. 2 The dissenting judge challenged each of these
reasons.
83
The dissent maintained that polygraph evidence has not overcome the
Frye "general acceptance" standard,84 asserting the three traditional objec-
tions to polygraph evidence. ss  The dissent concluded that polygraph
evidence should be inadmissible under Rules 70286 and 60887 because the
use of polygraph evidence under these rules does not eliminate the concerns
expressed in Rule 403. 88
The majority was not sufficiently convinced by its three reasons for
expanded admissibility to hold that all polygraph evidence is admissible.
Because polygraph "is a developing and inexact science," the court found that
it would be "inappropriate to allow the admission of polygraph evidence in all
situations in which more proven types of expert testimony are allowed."8 9
78. "[T]he Frye general acceptance test does not act as a bar to admission of
polygraph evidence as a matter of law." Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.




83. Id. at 1537-42.
84. Id. at 1537.
85. Id. at 1538-41. For the three traditional objections, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 57-63.
86. See supra note 74 for the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
87. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1542.
88. Id. at 1541.
89. Id. at 1535. The court then stated: "However, as Justice Potter Stewart
wrote, 'any rule of law that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes
as well the doing of justice."' Id. (citing Hawkings v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81
(1958) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
1991]
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The court adopted a balancing approach in which it would compare "the need
to admit all relevant and reliable evidence" with the danger of unfair
prejudice.90 The court found two instances in which the balance favored
admissibility of polygraph evidence.91
In both situations, the trial courts in the Eleventh Circuit continue to
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to polygraph evidence. 92 Specifically,
the judge is to apply Rules 401, 403, and 702. The court stated that the trial
judge has wide discretion in excluding polygraph expert testimony. 93
Reasons to exclude expert polygraph testimony include unacceptable
qualifications of the examiner, an unfair test procedure, a poorly administered
test, or irrelevant or improper questions.94
The first situation in which polygraph evidence should be allowed in the
Eleventh Circuit is where the parties stipulate to admissibility in advance of
the test.95 The parties must agree to the circumstances surrounding the test
and the scope of admissibility. 96 Circumstances include "material matters"
such as the manner of administering the test, the types of questions asked, and
identifying a polygraph examiner. 97 To stipulate to the scope of admissibili-
ty, the parties must agree upon the purposes for which the evidence will be
introduced. 98 When these requirements are met, the test results will be
admissible.99
The second situation in which polygraph evidence will be allowed is
when the evidence is offered for impeachment or corroboration, but admissi-
bility is subject to three conditions and the judge's discretion.' °° As an
example of the requirement that the use of polygraph evidence must satisfy
the rules concerning impeachment or corroboration, the court used Rule 608
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1535-36.
92. Id. at 1536.
93. Id. at 1537. The standard of review on appeal for such a decision is "a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676, 686
(11th Cir. 1984)).
94. Id.




99. Id. The dissent in Piccinonna agreed with the court's holding allowing the
stipulated use of polygraph evidence. Id. at 1537 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
100. Id. The three requirements are notice to the opposing party that polygraph
evidence will be offered, opportunity for that party to conduct its own examination,
and satisfaction of the Federal Rules as to impeachment and corroboration. See supra
text accompanying note 26.
[Vol. 56
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which allows "[e]vidence of truthful character" only after a witness's character
for truthfulness has been attacked. The court stated, "evidence that a witness
passed a polygraph examination, used to corroborate that witness's in-court
testimony, would not be admissible under 608 unless or until the credibility
of that witness were first attacked."101
The court, in announcing the criteria for the admission of polygraphic
evidence, did not resolve Piccinonna's dispute. Instead, it remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to conduct "further proceedings consistent
with this opinion."" z Understandably, the district court had difficulty
deciphering the court's opinion on remand. 03 The district court stated, "At
the outset, this court is unclear as to its duty under the Eleventh Circuit's
Delphic pronouncement. " 1 4 The district court found that Piccinonna had
satisfied the first two requirements under the exception for impeachment or
corroboration.' Nevertheless, the district court found the evidence
irrelevant and, alternatively, inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 608.
The district court sustained Piccinonna's conviction."°6
B. Underwood v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.
Underwood appealed the trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial or to
grant a new trial based on the admission of evidence concerning Underwood's
refusal to submit to the polygraph examination.'0 7 Abuse of discretion is the
standard of review for ruling on motions for mistrials and new trials in the
Eighth Circuit.'08 The court noted, citing a Seventh Circuit case, that the
district court may exercise its sound discretion in admitting or excluding
polygraph evidence.09 It also noted that polygraph evidence is usually excluded."10
101. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1537.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
104. Id. at 1336. The court found that it was to determine the admissibility of the
polygraph test which Piccinonna had taken in 1985 rather than grant a new trial or
consider the admissibility of a test Piccinonna had taken in January, 1990. Id.
105. Id. at 1337.
106. Id. at 1339.
107. Underwood, 888 F.2d at 589.
108. Id. at 590 (citing Ryco Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1221-22
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988) (motion for a new trial); Jim
Halsey Co. v. Bonar, 284 Ark. 461, 471, 683 S.W.2d 898, 905 (1985) (motion for a
mistrial)).
109. Id. (citing Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 F.2d 591, 604 (7th Cir.
1985)).
110. Id. (citing United States v. Dietrich, 854 F.2d 1056, 1059 (7th Cir. 1988)).
1991]
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In this case the Eighth Circuit held that the polygraph evidence was
admissible."' In allowing the evidence, the court accepted three of the
district court's reasons. First, the court specifically stated that this evidence
"was not offered as substantive evidence.""1 2 Instead, the evidence was
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because "[t]he jury could
have reasonably inferred from the conversation that [the deputy] suspected the
allegedly stolen items were still present in the house, and that the Deputy's
investigation was a motive for the ensuing fire."'1 Second, the polygraph
evidence was properly admitted to impeach Underwood's credibility.1 4
Colonial claimed the evidence was admissible under Rules 613, allowing
impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement, or 801(d)(2), allowing
admissions by party-opponents. Underwood's refusal to take the polygraph
exam was a prior inconsistent statement to his assertion at trial that he had
told the deputy he would cooperate." 5 In addition, the court found the
evidence admissible to impeach by contradiction." 6 Third, the court agreed
with the district court's decision that the probative value outweighed any
unfair prejudice, thus satisfying Federal Rule of Evidence 403.n7 The court
rejected the idea that the injection of the "polygraph reference was 'inadvert-
ent"' because defense counsel deliberately disobeyed the judge." 8 The court
thought, however, that the defect was cured by jury instructions." 9
IV. ANALYSIS
A. United States v. Piccinonna
In Piccinonna, the court purported to balance "the need to admit all
relevant and reliable evidence against the danger that the admission of the
111. Id. at 591.
112. Id. at 590.
113. Id. at 590-91. The court distinguished Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc.,
289 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1961). In Aetna, a witness to a fire refused to take a polygraph
examination after first stating that he would. The Eighth Circuit refused to admit into
evidence the refusal to take the polygraph exam. Aetna was distinguished on its facts
in that "[t]he polygraph evidence ... could not have shown motive under rule 404(b)
because the witness's refusal to submit to a polygraph test occurred after the fire."
Underwood, 888 F.2d at 591 (emphasis added).
114. Underwood, 888 F.2d at 591.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. This is the weighing to be done under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
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evidence for a given purpose will be unfairly prejudicial.', 120  The court
found two situations in which the balance favored admitting polygraph
evidence.
1. Stipulation
The first instance in which polygraph evidence will be allowed is when
the parties stipulate in advance to admissibility."' The court's requirements
for an effective stipulation'2 are set out in broad terms, yet the court's
approach recognizes the potential areas for dispute between the parties which
may arise after the examination. The laundry list of requirements is meant to
prevent future disagreements or at least provide a framework in which to
resolve them. When the required stipulations have been made, the court states
that "evidence of the test results is admissible."123 Admission, however, is
not mandatory; the judge must be sure that the evidence complies with Federal
Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.124
This result is very workable and rational. The rule allowing stipulation
recognizes that, usually, the parties may resolve the traditional objections to
polygraph evidence" among themselves. 26 Allowing the parties to settle
this among themselves alleviates the concerns that the use of polygraph
evidence will degenerate into nothing but a battle of the experts 27 and that
determining admissibility of polygraph evidence is too time consuming for the
courts. 28 This rule also recognizes that while stipulation may remove the
potential problem of unfair prejudice, the stipulated evidence may still confuse
the issues, mislead the jury, waste time,' 29 or simply be irrelevant.130
Maintaining the trial judge's control over expert testimony despite stipulation
120. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1535.
121. Id. at 1536.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
123. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
126. On this point the dissenting judge agreed. "If the parties wish to alter the
applicability of Rules 403 and 702 in their case, they should be able to do so by
advance stipulation, as long as they do not interfere with any third party's interests or
the adjudicatory role of the courts." Id. at 1537 n.1 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent would allow the trial judge "broad discretion" in
rejecting the stipulation. Id.
127. This is so because the parties agree to only one examination.
128. Sevilla, supra note 4, at 10.
129. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
130. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
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recognizes that occasionally situations which the parties did not contemplate
will occur and that there might be some abuse of the stipulation rule. The
rule formulated by the court is really a rule of convenience; the judge may
forego making any determinations based on the three principal objections to
polygraph evidence and may rule on the admission of the evidence in the
familiar Federal Rules of Evidence context.
131
2. Impeachment and Corroboration
The second situation in which polygraph evidence could be admitted
under Piccinonna is where the evidence is offered for impeachment or
corroboration.13 ' To be admitted for these purposes, no prior agreement
among the parties is necessary, but the party seeking admission must meet
three requirements.
The first two requirements seem fair. The proponent of the polygraph
evidence must give notice and provide the other party with an opportunity to
conduct its own polygraph examination. 3a These requirements keep the use
of polygraph evidence on an even playing field. Each party can attempt to
use polygraph evidence to its advantage. This does not mean that the original
proponent of the evidence will always use the evidence offensively (that is,
for corroboration), because a party may impeach its own witness.134
However fair these requirements may be, they seem to invite trouble. In
particular, the second requirement invites a "battle of the experts." While
expert swearing matches are not uncommon in the courtroom, they would be
unique for the purposes to which the Eleventh Circuit limits the use of
polygraph evidence; that is, impeachment or corroboration.
The third requirement for the admission of polygraph evidence, absent
stipulation, is to satisfy the Federal Rules on impeachment and corrobora-
tion.1 35  Because "polygraph is a developing and inexact science," 
136
testimony by a polygraph expert is not admissible as substantive evidence.
Thus, the testimony of the polygraph expert may help the trier of fact assess
the credibility of other evidence, but that evidence must already be before the
131. For the contrary view that polygraph evidence should not be admissible
despite stipulation, see Sevilla, supra note 4, at 13 (citing People v. Baynes, 88 lll.2d
225, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1981)).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
133. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
134. Federal Rule of Evidence 607 states that "[t]he credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness."
135. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
136. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1535.
[Vol. 56
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court.'37 Once the in-court testimony has been given, the ensuing battle of
experts over the subject's belief in the truth of statements made during an
examination does not present the jury with any information not already before
it. A battle of experts over the subject's belief in the truth of the statements
made, however, is to be distinguished from a conflict over the subject's
general character.
Although the district court on remand 8 found the polygraph evidence
inadmissible because it was irrelevant,'39 it also "suggest[ed] that even if the
1985 polygraph results had been deemed relevant, it is doubtful that such
evidence would ever be admissible," even if limited to impeachment or
corroboration °1 In its analysis, the district court did not distinguish
between the use of polygraph evidence for impeachment or corroboration and
its use to attack or bolster general credibility.
The district court stated that Rule 702'' had to be reconciled with Rule
608(b).14 Rule 608(b) prohibits proving specific instances of conduct by
extrinsic evidence; "[t]hus, the results of one specific polygraph test offered
as one specific instance of truthfulness would not be admissible pursuant to
Rule 608(b)." 43 Next, the district court stated that if Piccinonna attempted
to introduce the polygraph results as "expert opinion testimony and hence not
137. Requiring the topic of the expert's testimony previously to have been
introduced into evidence avoids the situation where the only relevance of the expert's
testimony would be the subject's general veracity.
138. United States v. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
139. The questions and answers recorded during the 1985 polygraph examination
failed both Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. The questions were not
"substantially the same questions" as those asked during the grand jury investigation.
Because of this, the probative value of the evidence was "slight," and the jury could
be mislead. The court recognized Piccinonna's argument that there is a degree of
unfairness in holding Piccinonna to the 1985 polygraph because he had no guidelines
for proper procedure. The district court found that the examiner could have posed the
identical questions which the grand jury asked; therefore the defendant was "bound by
his choice of questions." Id. at 1336-38.
140. Id. The court suggested a few ways in which the evidence would
nevertheless be inadmissible. The district court predicted the government in a criminal
trial would never stipulate because the offered evidence would always be favorable to
the defendant. Id. This would not necessarily be the case if, as in other circuits, the
stipulation was done before the exam was given. See supra text accompanying notes
68-70.
141. See supra note 74.
142. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. at 1336-38. See infra note 147.
143. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. at 1338.
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barred by Rule 608(b), the evidence might still be inadmissible" under Rule
608(a). 44 The court wrote:
Rule 608(a) limits testimony concerning the credibility of the witness to
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation but subject to the limitation
that "(1) the evidence may refer only' to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness."
This court holds that a single polygraph testing session represents an
inadequate foundation upon which an expert can base an opinion on the
defendant's "character" for truthfulness or untruthfulness. It is inconceiv-
able that anyone, expert or not, could form a valid, reliable, and admissible
opinion as to the "character" of a witness based on nothing more than one
single session, would be inadmissible as speculative and without any
adequate foundation, and is thus likely to mislead any fact finder.
145
The very nature of the polygraph exam means that the expert's opinion
is limited to a narrow temporal sphere. While the reputation and traditional
opinion witnesses may say."the witness has a reputation for truthfulness" and
"I consider the witness to be a truthful person," the polygraph expert may only
say that the subject was truthful during a day-long exam. The expert's
opinion based on a one-day exam has little to do with the subject's general
veracity.' 46 Thus, allowing a polygraph expert to testify to a subject's
veracity is a substantial departure from the traditional rule of allowing a
witness to testify to a subject's general veracity. Also, the polygraph exam
could be considered a "specific instance" under Rule 608(b), 147 but it is
unlikely that the polygraph examination could be considered "conduct" by the
subject. These concerns will largely prevent the admission of expert
polygraph evidence to attack a witness's character under Federal Rule of
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Of course, inquiry is allowed into the basis for the expert's opinion. FED.
R. EvID. 705.
147. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides, in part:
Specific instances of the conduct of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of
the witness (1) conceding the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified.
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
[Vol. 56
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Evidence 403.148 As long as the credibility of the witness has been raised,
it is hard to imagine a situation where the probative value of a polygraph
expert testifying to the witness's general veracity will outweigh the concerns
for confusing the issues, misleading the jury,149 or undue delay. 5  At the
very least, the judge's discretion could prevent the non-stipulated use of
polygraph evidence to attack the witness's general character for veracity.
The district court considered that "the Court of Appeals may have
intended to create an exception to Rule 608 in the case of polygraph
testimony," but this idea was rejected on the grounds that "had the appellate
court intended to create an exception to the rule, it would have done so
explicitly." 51 Indeed, if the Eleventh Circuit meant for the exam to be
treated as a specific instance of conduct, there would be no need to limit the
use of polygraph evidence to impeachment or corroboration. 52  Thus, a
court allowing polygraph evidence to show character would be adding a
method of proving character not approved by Congress in Rule 608.'5'
In stating that where polygraph evidence is offered to show character it
should be inadmissible under Rule 608, the district court was eminently
correct. The problem with this analysis, however, is that it does not address
148. The court specifically stated that the offered evidence must meet Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 before it will be allowed. See supra text accompanying note 93.
149. FED. R. EVID. 403.
150. The battle of the experts concerning the proper interpretation of polygraph
examination results will no doubt take considerable time.
151. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. at 1338.
152. As the advisory committee's note states:
Of the three methods of proving character provided by this rule, evidence
of specific instances of conduct is the most convincing. At the same time
it possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise,
and to consume time. Consequently the rule confines the use of evidence
of this kind to cases in which character is, in the strict sense, in issue and
hence deserving of a searching inquiry. When character is used circumstan-
tially and hence occupies a lesser status in the case, proof may be only by
reputation and opinion.
FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's note.
153. The court also evaluated the possibility that the question of admissibility was
to be answered solely on the basis of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, giving the trial
court discretion to establish "the quantum of evidence required to establish an adequate
foundation for expert testimony." The court rejected this idea for two related reasons.
First, the court found it "unlikely" that the Eleventh Circuit "intended to reduce the
existing standards pertaining to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under
Rule 702." Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. at 1338. Second, the court dismissed the notion
that the admissibility of polygraph evidence "should rest upon ... the subjective
judgment of individual trial judges" as to "what constitutes a sufficient predicate upon
which to base admissibility." Id.
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polygraph evidence offered to impeach or corroborate. Using polygraph
evidence to impeach or corroborate is different from normal impeachment or
corroboration evidence in that the statement made by the subject does not
become valuable because of its existence.154 Instead, the statement's value
is derived from its interpretation by an expert. Aside from the additional step
involved, it is difficult to see how the use of polygraph evidence to impeach
or corroborate is any different from other evidence offered for the same
purpose. Of course, the concerns raised in Rule 403 may overcome the
probative value of the evidence, but the increased likelihood of not satisfying
the Rule 403 requirement is not a sufficient ground to eliminate otherwise
relevant evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit's test, however, runs into serious problems where
the case involves a perjury charge or a crime in which dishonesty is an
essential element. If the defendant testifies and his testimony covers the
alleged dishonest actions, there necessarily will be impeaching evidence in
order to maintain the suit. Admitting polygraph evidence to impeach or
corroborate in this situation will have no different function than introducing
the polygraph evidence as regular substantive evidence. Distinguishing
between these two purposes on a theoretical level does little to alleviate the
practical effect that a conviction may be based upon (presumably) undesirable
polygraph evidence. A jury instruction fails to combat this problem. If
convictions based upon polygraph evidence are to be avoided, more assurance
is required than a subtle distinction which the jury is directed to acknowledge.
In addition, the court's test raises the interesting problem of whether to allow
a criminal defendant to use polygraph evidence where the defendant does not
take the stand. For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit's impeachment or
corroboration exception to polygraph evidence inadmissibility should not be
applied to criminal cases involving perjury or crimes for which dishonesty is
an essential element. Even if the circuit allows such use of polygraph
evidence, there is sufficient danger in improper use by the jury to exclude
polygraph evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
B. Underwood v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.
Underwood v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co. is much less troublesome
than Piccinonna. There, the evidence was offered for a strictly non-substan-
tive purpose. Indeed, one might argue that the case really did not involve a
polygraph evidence question.
154. Presumably, an inconsistent statement or an admission made during the
course of a polygraph test could be admitted into evidence without expert testimony.
Of course, the witness would still have the opportunity to explain an inconsistent
statement. See FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
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Strictly speaking, because there was no polygraph examination adminis-
tered, there could be no substantive use of the evidence in question. The only
substantive use of Underwood's refusal to submit to an exam would be the
negative inference drawn from his refusal. Used in this manner, the refusal
to take a polygraph exam is much like the refusal to take the stand in one's
own defense. Because using the latter as a negative inference of guilt is
impermissible, the former should be treated the same way at least in a
criminal case. Taking a polygraph test is, in a sense, like testifying because
one must make statements and have their credibility judged. The same
inferences from the failure to testify in one's own behalf, then, also apply to
the failure to submit to a polygraph exam. This is especially true in a
jurisdiction which prohibits the substantive use of polygraph results because
the failure to take an exam would produce substantive evidence while the
results of an exam actually administered could not be used substantively. The
end result is inconsistent treatment of polygraph evidence. Using polygraph
evidence (including the refusal to submit to polygraph examination) for non-
substantive purposes avoids many of the concerns with this type of evidence.
When polygraph evidence is offered for non-substantive purposes, the
traditional objections to polygraph admissibility become irrelevant or are
greatly reduced. Where the results of the test are not admitted, there can be
no challenge to their validity or to the reliability of polygraph testing in
general. Similarly, the results cannot be attacked through the insufficiency of
the procedures used in the exam or the lack of procedural standardization in
polygraph testing. In addition, if the results of the exam are not admitted for
their substantive value, but for some other reason, the courts may avoid the
question of who is qualified as a polygraph expert. The third traditional
objection to polygraph admissibility, undue influence upon the jury, retains
some of its force even where the evidence is offered for a non-substantive
purpose. A jury may still draw too great an inference from the fact that a
polygraph exam was taken or was refused.155 As with other evidence, such
as hearsay, the trial judge may give the jury cautionary instructions to prevent
improper use of the evidence. Of course, if the danger of improper use is too
great, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 will be grounds for excluding it.
V. CONCLUSION
Evidence of polygraph tests remain fraught with problems. Because
strong arguments can be made both for and against the admissibility of
polygraph evidence, it is wise for the courts to adopt a "go slow" approach.
155. For example, a jury might reason that a criminal defendant who took an
exam before trial failed that exam. This conclusion would follow from the fact that
the government is still prosecuting the defendant because he failed to clear his name.
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While a prophylactic per se exclusion rule is certainly easy to apply, it ignores
the prospect that in some situations evidence concerning polygraph testing will
survive Rule 403. Certainly, there is ample ammunition for the war over
whether polygraph testing has met the Frye standard. Courts should adopt
rules which recognize that evidence of polygraph tests has some value in
certain cases and which minimize the dangers perceived with polygraph
evidence. To say that the evidence on these dangers is inconclusive is no
justification for abandoning caution; indeed, it advocates caution. While
remaining cautious, the rules for polygraph evidence should remain flexible
to meet the myriad of situations in which the question will be presented.
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